La réalisation des promesses des partis au Québec 1994-2014.

François Pétry & Dominic Duval
Université Laval

Introduction

There has been a recent revival in the study of the fulfillment of campaign pledges by political parties. This revival has been accompanied by a renewed effort at developing causal explanations of variations in pledge fulfillment using comparative datasets across many countries, common definitions and reliability tests. The new comparative focus represents an important scientific advance by comparison with single-country based studies of pledge fulfillment which were conducted not so long ago, which were not truly comparable because they relied on different methodologies.

Recent comparative analyses have focused essentially on three types of determinants of variation in the extent of pledge fulfillment by parties: institutional factors (do majority governments fulfill more pledges than minority governments?), characteristics of individual pledges (are pledges to keep the status-quo fulfilled more frequently than pledges to change policy?) and change in economic conditions (is pledge fulfillment facilitated by economic growth?). These recent analyses are important and innovative, however they all share one limitation. None of them includes time as a determinant of pledge fulfillment. It is implicitly assumed that pledge fulfillment is a stochastic process such that the likelihood of fulfillment across time varies at random. But this cannot be true statistically. With a fixed amount of pledges made by a party in its election program, as the party fulfills additional pledges over time, the number of pledges left to be fulfilled, and therefore the likelihood of fulfillment, diminishes inexorably over time. The distribution of pledge fulfilled must be positively skewed as is the case in a geometric distribution.

This paper investigates the effect of incorporating a time variable in a statistical model of pledge fulfillment, and presents a method to take this effect into account in a multivariate analysis of variation in pledge fulfillment. By doing so, the model highlights yet unobserved dynamics. More precisely, the model predicts that if the government does not enact pledges within two years the probability of these pledge ever being fulfilled drops drastically.

The paper innovates in another way. Recent comparative research has focused exclusively on pledge fulfillment at the national level. There is to date no published research on the determinants of pledge fulfillment at the sub-national or regional level, leaving unanswered the questions of whether regional-level parties keep their promises as often as national parties and whether the determinants of pledge fulfillment are the same at both levels. To address these questions, the paper examines the pledge fulfillment record of the six Quebec governments between 1994 and 2014.

Our results indicate that while the determinants of pledge fulfillment in a subnational

setting like Quebec do not differ much from the determinants affecting pledge fulfillment in national contexts, time has a powerful statistical impact on the likelihood of pledge fulfillment. We conclude by proposing that time should be incorporated as a variable in future comparative research on pledge fulfillment.

The Quebec party system

The Quebec party system of today was born of the party realignment of the 1970s between the centrist federalist *Parti liberal du Québec* (PLQ) and the newly created left-of-center sovereigntist *Parti québécois* (PQ). The PQ and the PLQ have dominated the party system ever since, although their dominant position has been weakened by the presence of effective third parties of the center-right, the *Action démocratique du Québec* (ADQ) between the 1994 and 2008 elections, and the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) since the 2012 election. The transformation of the Quebec party system into a durable triparty system since 1994 has increased the likelihood that no party wins a majority of seats in the National Assembly, and must therefore from a minority government. The PLQ government elected in 2007, and the PQ government elected in 2012, were minority governments.

Hypotheses

Whether parties keep their campaign promises has become an important aspect of the political debate during and between elections. Political leaders often claim to hold a mandate to carry out their election program. Party programs, and the specific pledges that are written in them, receive considerable media attention during and between election campaigns, and there is a website to track on how the party in government keeps its election promises in Québec. The fulfillment of election pledges is not only a practical political issue. It is also an important theoretical issue in political science. The fulfillment of campaign pledges is at the heart of democratic accountability. If parties are responsive to societal demands, there should be a substantial level of congruence the policies they enact in power and the promises found in their election programs. It is, therefore not surprising that the claim that parties try to fulfill their campaign promises if elected to power is a the center of several important theories in political science: The mandate theory of elections (Manin   ), the responsible party model (   ) and the theory of promissory representation (Mansbridge 2003).

So far, time dynamics have been absent from existing models of pledge fulfillment. Paradoxically, time is highlighted as an important factor when discussing the inclusion of a government lifetime covariate. As Thomson *et al.* (2014) put it, the lifetime of the government is important given that a longer stay in power gives more time to enact pledges. The question we address in the paper can be worded as follows: at any moment during a party mandate, how much longer must the party stay in power to enact one more pledge from its election program? Given that the number of pledges in a party program is fixed, the number of pledges that remain unfulfilled at any stage of its mandate will inevitably decrease with time, and so with the likelihood of pledge fulfillment. This is true from a purely statistical point of view. Strategic considerations also lead parties to

make pledges that they can fulfill quickly. It is therefore expected that more pledges will be fulfilled sooner than later in the mandate. Another factor is the fact that party programs cannot anticipate everything. New decisions will have to be made during a mandate that were not anticipated during the election campaign, and the likelihood that this will occur increases as time goes by. As our data will show, the pledge fulfillment numbers are very high early on in a party mandate, and they are followed by much lower figures as the mandate goes on. Instead of seeing the need to analyze pledge fulfillment under an Event-History scheme as estimation nuisance we have to see it as an opportunity to look at a new set of substantive issues that can be modeled.

Let us examine some factors susceptible of influencing pledge fulfillment in Quebec between 1994 and 2014 and spell our expectations as to the direction of their influence. The first explanatory factor that we examine is time. As explained above, it is expected that parties will enact most of their pledges early on in their mandate. The likelihood of election pledges being fulfilled will be higher at first and then decrease considerably as new priorities arise and key elements are fulfilled (*H1*).

Another factor that we examine is institutional variation between majority and minority governments, the expectation being that the majority status of a governing party positively affects the likelihood that its pledge will be fulfilled. This expectation is based on the assumption that minority governments must reach policy compromise with opposition parties in order to govern, an obligation that majority governments are not forced to meet. The need to compromise may force the governing party to forgo the fulfillment of some of its promises which are not to the taste of opposition parties. Compromise may also lead the governing party to accommodate opposition parties by fulfilling some of their promises (*H2*).

We also look at whether a government is new in office or is re-elected. When a new legislature starts, a number of bills not adopted by the previous legislature are already in the legislative pipe-line. These bills are more likely to be the object of pledges in the program of the past incumbent party than in the program of past opposition parties. The bills are also more likely to become laws if the past incumbent party wins the election than if it is the party previously in opposition. Based on these considerations, it is expected that political parties in returning mandates are more likely to fulfill pledges than new governments (*H3*).

Another important factor is economic growth. Pledges are more likely to be fulfilled when governing parties have more financial resources at their disposal. Economic growth provide more government revenues, making it more likely for governments to fulfill pledges that increase public spending (e.g. a promise to expand healthcare or education spending) and that decrease government revenue (e.g. a promise to cut income tax). Conversely, poor economic conditions will reduce the ability to fulfill such pledges. It is therefore hypothesized that a bigger growth in the GDP should correlate with more pledges being fulfilled (*H4*).

We also expect that the characteristics of the pledges themselves may affect whether they are fulfilled. Pledges to expand programs or cut taxes are probably easier to fulfill,

especially in times of greater economic prosperity. Pledges to keep the status-quo are demonstrably easier to fulfill than pledge involving policy change, given the incrementalism of large governments (Thomson et al. 2014, Petry and Duval 2015). Pledges to raise taxes may also be difficult to keep. Another characteristic of pledges is whether they promise specific policy actions such as the passing of legislation or executive decisions (action pledges) or they promise to achieve a goal or a result such as reducing unemployment (outcome pledge). Action pledges usually involve relatively short term decisions that are under some control by the governing party. Outcome pledges typically involve more long-term goals that are conditional on factors that are not under the control of the governing party. Action pledges are expected to be harder to fulfill than status-quo pledges (*H5*).

Another factor to consider is the level of agreement between pledges by the party elected to power and by those of the parties in opposition. Agreement between government and opposition indicates that the pledge is in response to widely shared societal demands, rather than reflecting narrow partisan interests. Previous research on pledge fulfillment has found that pledges by the party in government are more likely to be acted upon when they are in agreement with pledges by opposition parties (Petry and Duval 2015, Thomson et al. 2014). In line with previous findings, it is hypothesized that pledges by a governing party that are in agreement with pledge by opposition parties are more likely to be fulfilled than pledges that are in disagreement with or unrelated to opposition parties' pledges (*H6*).

It is also expected that pledges that are more salient are more likely to be fulfilled than low profile pledges (*H7*). Salient pledges are defined as being more intensely covered by the media during election campaigns. There is comparative evidence that media coverage of election campaigns includes a substantial amount of information on specific pledges by the main political parties in Ireland (Costello and Thomson 2008) and in Quebec (Petry and Collette 2006). But the evidence about the impact of media coverage on the likelihood of pledge fulfillment is mixed: Petry and Collette (2006) find a significantly positive impact in Bulgaria and in Quebec, while Costello and Thomson (2008) find a non-significant negative impact.

The last factor relates to party left-right ideology and how it is reflected in pledge fulfillment. According to selective emphasis theory (Budge et al. 2001) parties selectively emphasize particular sets of issues that resonate well with their electorate. Petrocick's (1996) issue ownership theory makes a similar prediction. Both theories are supported by much empirical evidence (see Volkens et al. 2013 for a recent review). As previously explained, the responsible party model holds that there should be a high degree of congruence between the program of a party and the subsequent policies that the party implements if elected. In the light of selective emphasis and issue ownership, it seems logical that party left-right ideology reinforces the likelihood of congruence between party programs and government policies. It is hypothesized that pledges by a party of the left are more likely to be fulfilled if they are themselves classified on the left than if they are on the right. Conversely, pledges by a party of the right are more likely to be fulfilled if they are themselves classified on the right than on the left (*H8*).

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Method

We identified election pledges as defined by Thomson [2001]. The members of the Comparative Party Pledge Group (CPPG) also employ this method (see Naurin, Håkanson and Werner n.d.). Election pledges are statements that contain unequivocal support for proposed government policy actions or outcomes that are testable. The "unequivocal support" part of the definition stipulates that a statement must imply an explicit promise to do something. Some language is too soft to be considered "unequivocal support". Statements in which parties promised to "consider" or "look into" specific policy actions do not qualify as pledges under Thomson's definition. The second part of the definition stipulates that pledges contain "proposed government policy actions or outcomes" that are testable. This clause demands that pledges describe the proposed policy or outcome in an explicit way, that is such a way that a criterion is provided on the basis of which the fulfillment of the pledge can be judged. Regarding actions, these criteria consist of the passing of particular legislation or executive orders. Pledges may also refer to outcomes: for example, statements such as "we will strive toward reducing inflation", or "our program will reduce unemployment by 100,000". In other words, the criteria used to judge the fulfillment of pledges are provided by the writers of election programs, not by the researcher.

The coding scheme used for electoral pledges is fairly simple. At first, pledges are classified in three categories: pledges kept, pledges kept in part and broken pledges. To be classified as "kept" a pledge has to be followed by a subsequent government action (a law, a regulation, a treaty or an agreement) that has been passed or has reached second reading. A pledge is rated "kept in part" when the corresponding action is a compromise (the action is completed, but it does not go as far as what was promised). A pledge is classified as "broken" or "too soon to tell" in case of an ongoing government when it is not followed by a government action, and there is little or no expectation that action will be taken any time soon. Those categories are then regrouped under: "At least kept in part" [1] "fulfilled entirely or in part"[1] or "not carried out" [0] for analysis purposes as well as comparability with other members of the CPPG.

The pledges are then classified by type. In line with the CPPG literature, 7 types of pledges are identified: statu quo [1], governmental expansion [2], governmental cut [3], tax cut [4], tax increase [5] or other kinds of changes [6]. An additional type is also included to account for outcomes pledges [7] as opposed to the previous ones being output pledges. This last category is essentially an operationalization of the pledges that would fit under Royed's (1996) definition but not Thomson's.

Economic performance is operationalized by GDP growth in percentage point during the government's duration. The data was collected through the *Institut de Statistique du Québec's* website. New governments and majority governments are simply dummy variables [0/1].

Agreement is a categorical variable with the following five levels: No agreement or disagreement [0], in agreement with one party [1], in disagreement with one party [2], in agreement with both party [3], in agreement with one but in disagreement with the other

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[4] or in disagreement with both party [5]. Smaller third parties were omitted from this coding scheme given their relatively low importance and lack of seats prior to 2008 (1 seat). This means that the comparison was done between the PQ, PLQ and ADQ from 1994 to 2008 and between the PQ, PLQ and CAQ for 2012. The reason being that the ADQ dissolved itself in 2012 and was replaced, practically speaking, by the CAQ.

Electoral pledges were manually coded under the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) scheme. Following Laver and Budge (1992) the pledges coded under the thirteen Left categories were coded Left [1], the pledges falling under the thirteen Right categories were coded Right [2] and the rest was coded Neither [0].

Salience, or media exposure, was operationalized through the number of news articles relating to each pledge. Boolean strings were used in *Factiva*'s engine to find news articles explicitly referring to pledges, one by one, during the government's lifetime. The articles returned by Factiva were manually inspected to make sure they were in fact about the electoral pledge.

After coding the fulfillment of the pledges it was clear that there was time dependence, we noticed that the pledges that are fulfilled seemed to be fulfilled early on in the mandate rather than the opposite. This dependence is currently not accounted for in the models present in the literature. Following Beck, Katz and Tucker (BKT, 1998) we chose to model the fulfillment of pledges under a time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) analysis with a binary dependent variable. BKT demonstrated that BTSCS data are identical to grouped duration data. In essence, modeling the fulfillment of pledges this way allows us not to show not only when a pledge is fulfilled or not but also when the series "switch" from not fulfilled to fulfilled, how long does that take and what are the covariates associated with this change. In other words, this means that we are looking at the "status" (fulfillment) of each pledge at a given time, in this case trimesters for the duration of the mandate. Our data set consists of 603 pledges made over 6 governments over the period of 1994-2012 for a total of 8099 temporal observations.

This also meant the addition of a new variable, a time spell, which is a count of the number of trimesters since the mandate started or the fulfillment (event) occurred, which ever is most recent. BKT suggest to make time dummies (dummies for each of the different values of the time spell) or to use a temporal spline (low-degree of freedom B-spline). However, Carter and Signorino (2010) demonstrated that the inclusion of time dummies can induce estimation problems due to separation and suggest using a cubic polynomial approximation instead. We did both the B-spline approach and the cubic polynomial and the results were the same, we then opted to present the cubic polynomial approximation given its simplicity of implementation and interpretation with the hopes that the other scholars working on the topic of pledge fulfillment adopt this approach. Another positive aspect of the cubic polynomial approximation is that we do not have to select knots for the spline, a somehow simple procedure but that is often problematic in practice as noted by Carter and Signorino.

Including the cubic polynomial approximation is a trivial implementation; it simply consists of including the time spell, time spell squared and time spell cubed in the

regression models (*time*, *time*^{2}, *time*^{3}). Most of the work that comes with the choice of using BTSCS instead of regular pledges fulfillment logistic regression is transforming the structure of data set. As shown in Appendix A, the regular pledge fulfillment yielded a few non-sensical results that were in fact artifacts of our lack of regard for time dependence, reinforcing the need to adopt a BTSCS scheme.

Endogeneity

Before moving to a discussion of the non-institutional factors we expect to matter, a word about potential endogeneity is in order. We are interested in testing the degree to which institutional factors may inhibit pledge fulfillment. It might be countered that if a rational party has pledge fulfillment as a key goal, it would consider the future institutional environment it expects to encounter when making pledges. Parties that expect more obstacles would make more modest pledges. There are several possible responses to this. First, rational parties may have good reason to pledge things that they know to have a low probability of success. "Over-pledging" might make sense in terms of creating negotiating space in coalition or legislative negotiations. In addition, pledges serve a variety of functions, including signaling commitment to key supporters, and calculating fulfillment odds may well take a back seat to such concerns. In fact, the evidence we have makes us skeptical of the idea that parties can and do tailor their pledges according to the probability of successful fulfillment. The US case presents perhaps the best examples, where Republican Party platforms regularly pledge to enact a constitutional amendment banning abortion, when this is unlikely to be fulfilled without winning both the presidency and unrealistically large majorities in both houses.

A final response to endogeneity concerns is simply that the possibility does not preclude us from testing for institutional effects: if parties do indeed compensate for institutions when making pledges, we would find no institutional impact on pledge fulfillment. To the extent that we *do* find institutional effects, then, we have shown that even if parties do attempt to tailor their pledges according to the environment, institutions *still* matter.

Results

The descriptive results are first presented in the form of cross-tabs, followed by the presentation of a multivariate model.

We counted a total of 603 pledges in the six electoral platforms in our corpus (Table 1). Of those 362 (60%) were at least partly fulfilled and 241 that were not. The 1994PQ government made 99 pledges with a fulfillment rate of 63% (71 pledges at least partly fulfilled), the 1998PQ government made 127 pledges with a fulfillment rate of 74% (94 pledges at least partly fulfilled), the 2003PLQ's score is 60% with 56 pledges at least partly fulfilled out of 106, the 2007PLQ government made 98 pledges with a fulfillment rate of 56% (55 pledges at least partly fulfilled), the 2008PLQ government made 62 pledges with a fulfillment rate of 47% (29 pledges at least partly fulfilled) and the 2012PQ's score is 50% with 57 pledges out of 113 at least partly fulfilled. Looking at figure 2, we can clearly see what appears to be a downward slope in the fulfillment of

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electoral pledges in Quebec.

Table 1: Fulfillment by Government

Government	Kept	Kept in part	Not Kept	Total
1994PQ	61(61%)	10(10%)	28(28%)	99(100%)
1998PQ	83(65%)	11(9%)	33(26%)	127(100%)
2003PLQ	51(48%)	5(5%)	50(47%)	106(100%)
2007PLQ	47(48%)	8(8%)	43(44%)	98(100%)
2008PLQ	26(42%)	3(5%)	33(53%)	62(100%)
2012PQ	26(23%)	31(27%)	56(50%)	113(100%)
Total	294(49%)	68(11%)	241(40%)	603(100%)

Our "comparison baseline" are the 441 pledges out of 604 (73%) being at least partly fulfilled at the federal level between 2000 and 2014 reported by Pétry and Duval (2015). The federal context is quite comparable to the provincial one given that we are in the presence of the same electoral system and that there were also two relatively short minority governments federally during the last decade. Despite the many similarities, Quebec's score is significantly lower, the difference being 13 percentage points.

Figure 1: Histogram of the Fulfillment by Government

In comparison, the proportion of fulfillment in the United States from 1976 to 2000 was

64.4%, 85.4% in the United Kingdom from 1974 to 1997 and 50.3% in Ireland from 1977 to 2007 [Thomson *et al.,* 2014]. The international average of the 10 countries members of the CPPG in 2009 was 67% [Naurin, 2009].

Table 2: Fulfillment by Pledge Type

Type	Kept	Kept in part	Not Kept	Total
Statu quo	31(51.7%)	10(16.7%)	19(31.7%)	60(100%)
Gov. Cut	8(38.1%)	3(14.3%)	10(47.6%)	21(100%)
Gov.Expansion	88(47.8%)	22(12.0%)	74(40.2%)	184(100%)
Tax Cut	1(12.5%)	1(12.5%)	6(75.0%)	8(100%)
Tax Increase	19(47.5%)	1(2.5%)	20(50.0%)	40(100%)
Other	106(52.0%)	20(9.8%)	78(38.2%)	204(100%)
Outcome	40(46.5%)	12(14.0%)	34(39.5%)	86(100%)
Total	294(49%)	68(11%)	241(40%)	603(100%)

Looking at the pledge types (Table 2) we notice that most status quo pledges are at least partly fulfilled with a 68% fulfillment rate. Other types of pledge faring better than the average are government expansion pledges (60%), outcome pledges (60%) and other pledges (62%). These results are somehow surprising, literature would suggest that statu quo pledges' rate should be nearly perfect given that they require no governmental action. We also notice that very little pledges involving cuts (governmental or taxes) have been made. We count less than 30 cuts pledges over the last 20 years, representing a total of only 5% of the total amount of pledges. Given that and the high proportion of pledges simply labeled as "other" (24%) we might suggest that the CCPG typology is not especially appropriate for all cases, including this one. Or at least that it is not precise enough.

The results in Table 3 are not surprising. Majority governments do fare better than minority ones. We can see that this difference seems to be mostly between the proportion of kept pledges and pledges kept in part. The minority governments studied had much more trouble totally fulfilling pledges with 35% when in comparison majority governments achieved 56%. Minority governments have a higher proportion of their pledges falling under kept in part with 18% in comparison with 7% for majority governments. This can be attributed to the compromises that minority governments were "forced" to make and to the short duration of their mandates which will be discussed later on. Outcome pledges do represent a good number of pledges as we expected (72 for 12%; *H1*).

Table 3: Fulfillment by Government Type

Government	Kept	Kept in part	Not Kept	Total
Minority	73(35%)	39(18%)	99(47%)	211(100%)

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Majority	221(56%)	29(8%)	142(36%)	392(100%)

A similar phenomenon appears to be occurring when we look at whether governments are returning ones or new ones (Table 4). The aggregated fulfillment numbers show very little difference with 62% of pledges being at least partly fulfilled during recurring governments and 59% for new governments. We do however notice an important difference between the proportions of kept and kept in part pledges. New governments seem to have more trouble completely fulfilling their pledges with a higher proportion of tem falling under kept in part (15%) in comparison to recurring governments (8%). This is an important observation, as this is not accounted for in the statistical models on the topic of pledge fulfillment as they use aggregated scores in order to run logistic regression models. This paper is however no exception.

Table 4: Fulfillment by Government Reoccurrence

Mandate	Kept	Kept in part	Not Kept	Total
Not First	156(54%)	22(8%)	109(38%)	287(100%)
First	138(44%)	46(14%)	132(42%)	316(100%)

Table 5 looks at the agreement and disagreement of pledges between parties. What we first notice is the low amount of pledges in disagreement with one of both parties. In fact, only 22 pledges out of 603 are in disagreement with pledges made by at least one other party. Most pledges, 65%, are simply unrelated to the pledges of other parties. Then we have 194 pledges (32%) that are in agreement with at least one the opposing parties' pledges. Looking at the fulfillment rate of these categories does not seem to reveal any kind of relations. Pledges that are in disagreement with one party are surprisingly the category with the best fulfillment score at 73%. Followed closely by pledges in agreement with both opposition parties at 70%. This exercise seems to be inconclusive and does not follow what the literature suggests in regards of fulfillment. It is however interesting in regards to saliency theories given that we do indeed observe few disagreements suggesting that all the parties are arguably aiming for the same, central, electorate. The CMP scores of the parties here studied corroborate this. Both the PQ and PLQ are centrist parties with a slight left tendency while the ADQ and CAQ have a slight tendency to the right. See Appendix B for more details as to the ideological placement of parties in Quebec for the period studied.

Table 5: Fulfillment by Agreement

Agreement	Kept	Kept in part	Not Kept	Total
No Agreement or Disagreement	197(50%)	28(7%)	167(43%)	392(100%)
In agreement with one party	65(45%)	27(18%)	54(37%)	146(100%)
In disagreement with one party	8(53%)	3(20%)	4(27%)	15(100%)

|				
In agreement with both	20(47%)	10(23%)	13(30%)	43(100%)
Agrees with one, disagrees with the other	3(60%)	0	2(40%)	5(100%)
Disagrees with both	1(50%)	0	1(50%)	2(100%)

Echoing the CMP observations is the Left-Right distribution of pledges (Table 6). We first notice that most of the pledges (58%) are not ideologically loaded. Pledges that are neither aligned to the Left or Right represent the category most often fulfilled with a score of 63%. Both Left and Right pledges have the same aggregated score of 57%. We do however notice that pledges to the right of the spectrum are more often fulfilled in part while pledges to the left of the spectrum are more often completely fulfilled. The proportion of pledges also varies. Pledges to the left of the spectrum represent 31% of the total pledges while pledges to the right of the spectrum represent only 12%. This comes as no surprise given what we already noted above about pledges relating to cuts and the ideological alignment of the government parties studied.

Table 6: Fulfillment by Ideological Position

Position	Kept	Kept in part	Not Kept	Total
Neither	177(51%)	41(12%)	131(37%)	349(100%)
Left	91(49%)	15(8%)	81(43%)	187(100%)
Right	26(39%)	12(18%)	29(43%)	67(100%)

Last but not least, the observation of the fulfillment of pledges through time (Figure 2) illustrates that the fulfillment of pledges during a mandate is far from uniform. As expected there is a concentration in the fulfillment of pledges early on in the mandate followed by a drastic drop. This suggests that time is not a positive linear covariate as implicitly assumed so far in the literature on pledge fulfillment.

Figure 2: Pledges Fulfilled Through Time

The bivariate results that have been presented so far are suggestive of which theoretical expectations are fulfilled. We need now to test these expectations statistically in a multivariate model, in which the numerical variables relating to economic growth, government duration and media exposure will be added to the variable already discussed. As mentioned above we do so in BTSCS regressions models with a cubic polynomial approximation of time where our dependent variable is the fulfillment of pledges (Table 7). Model 1 tests contextual variables and we add pledge-specific variables in model 2.

Table 7: Determinants of pledge fulfillment

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	-0.885***	-0.767***
	(0.084)	(0.117)
Party: PQ / PLQ	0.429***	0.487***
	(0.075)	(0.078)
Economic Growth	0.051***	0.034*
	(0.015)	(0.016)
First Mandate	-0.165*	-0.278***
	(0.069)	(0.073)
Majority Government	0.012	0.090
	(0.117)	(0.122)
Gov. Cut / Statu Quo		-0.089
		(0.155)
Gov. Expansion / Statu Quo		-0.240**
		(0.092)
Tax Cut / Statu Quo		-1.332***
		(0.397)
Tax Increase / Statu Quo		-0.049
		(0.124)
Other / Statu Quo		0.075
		(0.092)
Outcome / Statu Quo		-0.139
		(0.101)
Agrees with one and disagreement with the other / Neither		0.405
		(0.260)
In agreement with both / Neither		0.355***
		(0.096)
In agreement with one / Neither		0.006
		(0.057)
In disagreement with both / Neither		-0.972*
		(0.489)
In disagreement with one / Neither		0.867***
		(0.160)
Left /Neither		-0.007
		(0.056)
Right / Neither		0.010
		(0.082
Saliency in media		-0.000
		(0.000)
time	-0.051	-0.048
	(0.037)	(0.038)
time^2	0.020**	0.020**
	(0.006)	(0.006)
time^3	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Log-likelihood	-5266.46	-5217.56
N	8099	8099

As the bivariate tables foreshadowed, minority government do nearly as good of a job fulfilling their election promises, at least by our "at least fulfilled" metric. This is in line with earlier results that show that minority governments are as likely to fulfill pledges as majority governments in non-Westminster systems. We therefore find no support for *H2* as our hypothesis was that minority in a Westminster system such as Quebec would have to compromise in order to accommodate opposition parties. However, we believe it is important to note that this may be due in part to the metric used, given that the minority governments we studied have a much higher proportion of pledges being "fulfilled in part".

We do however find support for *H3*. First-mandate governments are much less likely to fulfill their election pledges than returning government as hypothesized.

Economic growth provides more government revenues, making it more likely for governments to fulfill pledges. Our hypotheses that pledges are more likely to be fulfilled in periods of higher economic growth (*H4*) is supported by the data. This finding is in line with earlier results on pledge fulfillment (Thomson *et al.* 2014).

Also in line with the literature is the finding that pledges to maintain the status quo on a particular policy are significantly more likely to be fulfilled than action pledges involving government expansion or tax cuts (*H5*).

We hypothesized that pledges by a governing party that are in agreement with pledges by opposition parties are more likely to be fulfilled than pledges that are in disagreement with or unrelated to opposition parties' pledges (*H6*). We only find partial support for this hypothesis. As it turns out, pledges in disagreement with the pledges of one other party are more likely to be fulfilled than pledges unrelated to the pledges of other parties. However, we find that pledges in agreement with the pledges of the two other parties are significantly more likely to be fulfilled, and pledges in disagreement with the pledges of the two other parties are significantly less likely to be fulfilled than pledges unrelated to those of other parties.

We find nothing to support the hypothesis that pledges that are more salient in the media are more likely to be fulfilled than low profile pledges (*H7*). The effect of this variable is not only statistically insignificant, is zero. Similarly, we find no statistical support for our hypotheses relating to the ideological placement of pledges (*H8*).

This brings us to the most central variable of the paper: As we can see, time matters. The coefficients for the variable *time* are not statistically significant, but they are highly significant for the variables *time*^{2} and *time*^{3}. To allow a visual interpretation, and as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010) we draw a hazard plot (Figure 3). This is essentially a graphical representation of the effect of time on the probability of pledges being fulfilled. Holding everything else constant, the likelihood of election pledges being fulfilled will be higher at first and then decrease considerably as hypothesized (*H1*). More specifically, we notice that after two years in power (inflection point ~ 8th trimester) if a pledge has not been fulfilled it is most likely that it won't be at all. The drop in probability is quite dramatic as the next election approaches. Highlighting what we

believe is a pledge-fulfillment cycle. While we have no direct evidence as to the reasons or motives behind the mid-mandate drop in likelihood it is nonetheless present.

Figure 3: The Effect of Time on Pledge Fulfillment (Hazard Plot)

Conclusion & Discussion

Time is not an estimation nuisance but rather an integral part of the phenomenon we're trying to explain. Furthermore, we have the methodological tools to model this important substantive facet of pledge fulfillment. We believe that scholars studying pledge fulfillment should employ the tools we have here imported from other fields of political science if only to control for the temporal bias caused by the selection of manifesto pledges.

We recommend looking at pledge fulfillment as Event-History and modeling it accordingly. We suggest a BTSCS framework that uses cubic polynomial approximation of time. It is to be noted that using a spline would be as good albeit a little more complicated and one would have to discuss knot selection.

While we should not press the analysis results too hard, it is interesting to notice that the pledge fulfillment in this regional context is much lower than the fulfillment of pledges at the national level despite all the similarities shared by the two. Whether this can be generalized or not is still unknown, further studies are needed. Regardless, this raises

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numerous questions in regards to mandate theory with only 49% of the promise being fully kept. This number even drops to 40% if we only look at the past decade (2004-2014). This downward slope is also a source of worry.

Some pledges are arguably harder to fulfill than others and this is not well captured by the *CPPG* typology. An example of that there is pledges relating to items already in the legislative pipeline. Another is the occurrence of what could be labeled "transactional" pledges: small targeted appeals to specific groups of voters who are treated more as consumers than citizens. This constitutes a new research direction that we are currently investigating.

The literature suggests that the fulfillment of electoral pledges is often perceived more negatively than the national fulfillment scores would warrant (Thomson 2011, Pétry 2014). What we found here might suggest an alternative explanation that has yet to be investigated. Citizens are not exclusively subject to national-level pledges, but also to regional-level and local-level pledges, while negativity in democratic politics is a relatively common phenomenon (Soroka, 2014), looking at the perception of national level pledges in a vacuum may pause problem.

This first foray in the topic of regional level pledge fulfillment raises more questions than it answers. The baseline is that it suggests that what has been concluded studying national level pledges can't be assumed *de facto* of the other levels at which elections happen.

Appendix A

Table A1: "Regular" Logistic Regression Models of the pledge fulfillment

	model1	model2
(Intercept)	11.395**	10.544*
	(4.227)	(4.541)
parti: pq/plq	0.008	−0.137
	(0.291)	(0.308)
econ	0.436*	0.443*
	(0.211)	(0.223)
months	−0.668**	−0.636*
	(0.252)	(0.267)
first	−0.142	−0.035
	(0.263)	(0.276)
majo	15.849**	14.862*
	(5.926)	(6.275)
type: 2/1		0.698
		(0.551)
type: 3/1		0.352
		(0.343)
type: 4/1		1.604
		(0.917)
type: 5/1		0.652
		(0.446)
type: 6/1		0.396
		(0.352)
type: 7/1		0.243
		(0.385)
cont: In Agreement with 1/No		−0.334
		(0.211)
cont: In Disagreement with 1/No		−0.658
		(0.615)
cont: In agreement with both/No		−0.671
		(0.365)
cont: Agrees with one Disagrees with the other/No		−0.762
		(0.997)
cont: In disagreement with both/No		0.479
		(1.534)
leftright: L/N		0.098
		(0.201)
leftright: R/N		0.151
		(0.289)
articles		0.000
		(0.001)
Nagelkerke R-sq.	0.065	0.091
Log-likelihood	−390.806	−384.737
Deviance	781.613	769.473
AIC	793.613	809.473
BIC	820.024	897.511
N	603	603

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